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Abstract
This paper demonstrates the diverse dynamical possibilities arising out of a simple macroe-
conomic model of debt-financed investment-led growth in the presence of interest rate rules.
We show possibilities of convergence to steady state, growth cycles around it as well as
various complex dynamics. We investigate whether, given this framework, the financial sec-
tor can provide endogenous bounds to an otherwise unstable system. The effectiveness of
monetary policy in the form of a Taylor-type interest rate rule targeting capacity utilization
is examined under this context.
Keywords: Growth cycles, Hopf bifurcation, complex dynamics, Taylor rule.
JEL classification: C62; C69; E12; E32; E44; G01
∗The paper draws extensively from the author’s Ph.D. thesis, titled Macrodynamics of Financing Investment:
Applications of Lotka-Volterra Class of Models, completed at CESP, JNU, New Delhi under the supervision
of Prof. Anjan Mukherji in 2011. An early version of this paper was presented at the 2013 Economic Theory
and Policy Conference, jointly organized by National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (New Delhi),
Jawaharlal Nehru University and Kagawa University. The author is grateful to the participants of this
conference for their useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider the complex dynamical possibilities of real-financial interaction in
demand constrained closed economies. In particular, we investigate whether a combination of
debt-financing of investment and simple monetary policy rules can provide endogenous expla-
nations for persistent growth cycles as well as more complex dynamical possibilities emerging
from such economies. In addition, we also examine the effectiveness of monetary policy, in the
form of interest rate rules, in these economies.
The basic motivation for this study comes from our observation of a two-way causality be-
tween the real and the financial sector. A simple interaction between the multiplier and the
accelerator might give rise to a monotonic movement of output and investment. Such models,
therefore, would require exogenous ceilings and floors to stay bounded. It would be interest-
ing to see, however, whether inclusion of financial factors can provide endogenous boundaries
to such systems. If this is indeed the case, then one might argue that these financial factors
have a stabilizing impact on the otherwise destabilizing multiplier-accelerator relationship of
the Harrodian class of models. Such a stabilizing role of the financial sector runs contrary to a
large literature orginating from, say, (Fisher 1932, Fisher 1933) or (Minsky 1975, Minsky 1982,
Minsky 1986, Minsky 1994), which typically considers the financial sector destabilizing. Min-
sky’s contribution, in particular, has influenced a huge literature on debt- deflation and financial
crisis.1 However, a critical component of Minsky’s story, consisting of uncertainties regarding
realization of profits and its consequent impact on repayment of debt commitments, is described
at the microeconomic level. In a demand-constrained economy, a higher investment translates
to a higher level of macroeconomic profits through the operation of the multiplier. Hence, there
is no straightforward way to aggregate the above story of problems arising out of uncertainties
faced by individual firms over realization of profits from investment to the macroeconomic level.
An alternative story is required, therefore, to explain why during a prolonged boom there is a
steady shift among firms from hedge towards speculative and ponzi financial postures, increas-
ing the overall indebtedness and leverage in the economy and eventually leading to a financial
crisis putting an end to the boom. We attempt to provide an alternative macroeconomic story
of Minsky’s arguments in the following sections, and explore to what extent the financial sec-
tor might be looked upon as a stabilizing (rather than destabilizing) force in this framework,
albeit in the limited sense of providing endogenous bounds to the system. We also examine the
effectiveness of a Taylor-type interest rate rule which targets capacity utilization in this context.
The basic building blocks of the model presented in the following sections have earlier been
discussed in greater detail in Datta (2011) and Datta (forthcoming). These consist of an in-
vestment function with financial dampeners to accelerator, a dynamic equation describing debt
1See, for instance, Kindleberger’s (1978) interesting and influential account of financial cycles, or the large
number of economic models on financial fragility, which originates in an attempt to model at least
some aspect of Minsky’s descriptive account, e.g. Taylor & O’Connell (1985), Lavoie (1986-87), Foley
(1987), Semmler (1987), Downe (1987), Franke & Semmler (1989), Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993), Palley
(1994), Skott (1994, 1995), Keen (1995, 1996), Andresen (1996, 1999), Vercelli (2000), Asada (2001), Lagunoff
& Schreft (2001), Arena & Raybaut (2001), Chiarella, Flaschel & Semmler (2001), Fazzari, Ferri & Greenberg
(2001), Gatti & Gallegati (2001), Foley (2003), Setterfield (2004), Datta (2005), Meirelles & Lima (2006), Lima
& Meirelles (2007), Fazzari, Ferri & Greenberg (2008), Taylor & von Arnim (2008), Charles (2008, ?), Guilmi,
Gallegati & Landini (2009).
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dynamics and a Taylor-type interest rate rule targeting capacity utilization (instead of targeting
inflation, as is usually the case in the literature). In Datta (2011), we saw that a simple interac-
tion between a post-Keynesian investment function with financial dampeners and a Taylor-type
interest rate rule targeting capacity utilization is able to generate growth cycles. In Datta
(forthcoming), we showed that in the absence of policy intervention, with a constant rate of
interest, interaction between an investment function and debt dynamics are able to generate
business cycles preceded by financial cycles. In this paper, we attempt to examine the outcome
of an interaction of all the above three relations in a single dynamic model. Unlike a substantial
literature in this area, income distribution considerations do not constitute the main focus of
this paper. Hence we proceed with the assumption of a given distribution of income among
various social classes.
We begin in section 2 by developing a baseline model of real-financial interaction, consisting
of an investment function, an equation of debt dynamics and an interest rate rule. We then
proceed to discuss the various macroeconomic feedback effects of this model in section 3. An
exercise in comparative dynamics is attempted in section 4. We explore both cyclical as well as
some of the other rich dynamical possibilities of this model in section 5. The main conclusions
are discussed in section 6.
2. The Model
2.1. Goods Market
We consider a simple continuous time model of a closed economy, consisting of the firm and the
household sector. The household sector consists of two kinds of households – type 1 households
consisting of workers, deriving income from wages, and type 2 and 3 households, deriving their
income from two kinds of financial assets, debt and equities respectively. The aggregate demand
at time t, AD (t), is composed of the total expenditure on investment and consumption made
by the firms and the households respectively, i.e. AD (t) = C (t) + I (t). A firm finances its
investment either internally out of retained earnings, or externally by issuing debt and equity
instruments. The national income, Y , might be measured by income method as the sum of
wages, W , and profits, P , i.e. Y (t) =W (t)+P (t). In terms of various sectors in the economy,
the total income might also be represented as Y (t) = Yf (t) + Yh1 (t) + Yh2 (t) + Yh3 (t), where
Yf , Yh1, Yh2 and Yh3 is the income to firms (profits after paying outstanding debt commitments
and dividends) and type 1, type 2 and type 3 households respectively. In other words, Yf (t) =
σP (t), where σ is the fraction of profits retained by firms; whereas Yh1 (t) = W (t), where W
represents the wages; so that Yh2 (t) = (1− σ)P (t)− Yh3 (t), with Yh2 and Yh3 being the part
of profits representing return to financial assets (debt and equities). If s1, s2 and s3 represent
the fraction of the respective incomes saved by type 1, 2 & 3 households respectively, with
s1 < s2 = s3, then we have
C (t) = (1− s1)W (t) + (1− s2) (1− σ)P (t) (1)
Assuming a regime of mark-up pricing, where the price per unit is obtained by adding a fixed
mark-up over the wage costs of production, we have
P (t) = ψY (t) (2)
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where ψ is the share of profits in national income. Following a simple algebraic manipulation,
the consumption by the household sector can now be represented as C (t) = (1− s)Y (t), where
s = 1−{(1− s1) (1− ψ) + (1− s2) (1− σ)ψ} is the propensity to save out of national income.
Let the potential output or the rate of capacity of production in the economy, Y ⋆, be defined
as the maximum output that can possibly be produced, given the existing constraints of fac-
tors and a given technology. Assuming the availability of capital as the binding constraint on
production, we have Y ⋆ (t) = βK (t), where β is the output-capital ratio determined by the ex-
isting technology. The actual level of output or the national income, Y , can now be represented
as Y (t) = min (AD (t) , Y ⋆ (t)). In other words, for all AD ≤ Y ⋆, aggregate demand acts as
the main constraint on the level of production and the output is determined by the aggregate
demand.
At the goods market equilibrium, the level of output measured by the income method equals
the aggregate demand, i.e. Y (t) = AD (t) so that W (t) + P (t) = C (t) + I (t). Substituting
the value of C from (1), we have
Y (t) =
1
s
I (t) (3)
Let the rate of capacity utilization be defined as the ratio of actual to potential output, i.e.
u (t) =
Y (t)
Y ⋆ (t)
(4)
We define the rate of investment,
g (t) ≡
I (t)
K (t)
(5)
From the definition of u, Y ⋆ and g, and the goods market equilibrium condition given in (3),
we have
g (t) = sβu (t) (6)
with a feasibility condition 0 ≤ u ≤ 1⇔ 0 ≤ g ≤ gmax, where gmax ≡ sβ represents the rate of
investment corresponding to full capacity utilization.
Next, we set up an investment function. A substantial literature, following the arguments
given by Steindl (1952, part II, chapter X), includes the rate of capacity utilization as one of
the factors affecting investment. Within this broad category of investment functions with the
rate of capacity utilization as an argument, however, there has emerged two distinct traditions
in the literature regarding the manner in which the rate of capacity utilization is included
in the investment function. The class of investment functions usually referred to as ‘post-
Keynesian’, ‘neo-Kaleckian’ or ‘Steindlian’ involves postulating a simple monotonic relationship
between rate of investment and the rate of capacity utilization (see, for instance, Bhaduri &
Marglin 1990, Dutt 2006a, Dutt 2006b, Bhaduri 2008, Setterfield 2009), whereas the class of
investment functions referred to as ‘Classical’, ‘Harrodian’, or ‘Marxian’ involves postulating
investment as a function of deviation of actual rate of capacity utilization from its exogenously
specified normal rate (see, for instance, Dume´nil & Le´vy 1999, Flaschel & Skott 2006, Shaikh
2009). While both classes of investment functions yield similar short-run conclusions, the long-
run implications differ. The dependence of investment to the rate of capacity utilization is
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maintained in long-run steady state in the former class of investment functions, while in the
latter, this dependence disappears in long-run. Lavoie, Rodr´ıguez & Seccareccia (2004) offers a
reconciliation to this debate by suggesting an alternative interpretation of the ‘post-Keynesian’
investment function, where the normal rate of capacity utilization is determined endogenously,
depending on the actual rate of capacity utilization.2 We follow this interpretation and hence,
suggest an investment function which does not explicitly include an exogenously specified normal
rate of capacity utilization. Let g⋆, the desired rate of investment, depend directly and linearly
on the rate of capacity utilization, i.e. g⋆ (t) = γ¯ + γ (t)u (t). Substituting from (6), we have
g⋆ (t) = γ¯ +
γ (t) g (t)
sβ
(7)
where γ is the ‘financial accelerator’ or the sensitivity of the desired rate of investment, g⋆
to the rate of capacity utilization, u, and is endogenously determined by financial factors. γ¯,
on the other hand, due to reasons given by Dume´nil & Le´vy (1999, page 686), comprises the
exogenous component of investment. Next, we turn our attention to the financial sector.
2.2. Dynamics of Debt
Consider a simple model of debt dynamics. The total stock of outstanding debt commitment
in any given period, t, is given by a history of borrowing, B, at a rate of interest, r (t), and
repayment, R. Hence, the stock of debt in period t is given by
D (t) =
t∫
τ=0
(B (τ)−R (τ)) er(t)(t−τ)dτ (8)
which, with simple algebraic manipulation and differentiation with respect to t, reduces to
D˙ (t) = B (t)−R (t) + r (t)D (t) (9)
Equation (9) provides us with the basic accounting identity describing the growth in stock of
debt. Next, we proceed to construct a macroeconomic index of financial fragility or gearing
ratio, in the form of a ratio of the level of indebtedness to the ability to pay for all the debtors,
i.e. the firm sector together.
In any time period, t, the firm sector’s total payment commitment consists of principal and
interest commitments. However, since the debt stock is accumulated over a period of time,
the debtors are expected to pay only a part of the total principal in a given period. For each
borrower, the minimum part of principal that is expected to be paid back in each period would
differ, and would, among other things, depend on a credit rating of the borrower by the lenders.
A borrower who is considered relatively safe (i.e. less likely to default) by the lenders would
be expected to pay a smaller fraction of the principal in each period than a borrower who is
considered relatively unsafe. In other words, borrowers with higher credit ratings will have
access to loans with longer terms, resulting in a proportionally smaller minimum repayment
requirements each period.
2For more on this debate, see Commendatore (2006), Hein, Lavoie & van Treeck (2008), Skott (2008, 2010) and
the critique of Dume´nil & Le´vy’s (1999) model by Lavoie & Kriesler (2007).
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At the macroeconomic level, however, the lenders as a whole expect, in each time period, an
exogenously given minimum fraction of the total debt stock as repayment towards the principal.
Let this fraction be q of the total outstanding debt commitments. The interest commitments, on
the other hand, are accumulated within the time period, and hence, are expected to be fully paid.
In any given period t, therefore, the total minimum payment commitment of debtors is given
by (q + r)D (t), where qD (t) and rD (t) is the principal and interest component respectively.
These payments are to be paid by the debtors out of their current retained profits or the
internal finance. In other words, current retained profits are used to repay current payment
commitments, and the residual determines the level of retained profits in the next period. The
macroeconomic index of financial fragility or gearing ratio can now be represented as
λ (t) =
[q + r (t)]D (t)
σP (t)
(10)
We define
d (t) ≡
D (t)
K (t)
(11)
as the stock of debt in intensive form. Substituting from (2), (3), (5) and (11) into (10), we
have
λ (t) =
[q + r (t)] sd (t)
σψg (t)
(12)
The actual repayment in period t, denoted by R (t), however, is independent of [q + r (t)]D (t).
It might either exceed or fall short of it, depending on the profile of the borrowers and repay-
ment by individual borrowers. Let us consider a situation where a fraction φ (t) of the total
outstanding debt stock is repaid in period t, i.e.
R (t) = φ (t)D (t) (13)
This fraction, φ (t) depends on:
1. The ability of the firms to repay, given by the ratio of retained profits to capital stock,
σP/K. A higher level of retained profits would enable the borrowers to repay a larger
fraction of the outstanding debt commitments without altering it’s capital structure (i.e.
without taking recourse to additional external finance); and,
2. The level of the index of financial fragility, λ. Higher level of λ is associated with a
borrower profile where firms, in general, have higher gearing ratios, and hence, are forced
to repay back a higher fraction of outstanding debt stock. Thus, in aggregate, a higher
fraction of outstanding debt stock will actually be repaid back.
Based on these considerations, we suggest the following functional form for φ (t):
φ (t) = φ
(
σP (t)
K (t)
, λ (t)
)
; φσP/K > 0, φλ > 0 (14)
which, taking a linear functional form, might be expressed as φ (t) = mσP (t)K(t) λ (t), where m is
constant. Substituting for the value of P (t) from (2) & (3), and for the value of λ (t) from (10),
we have φ (t) = m (q + r) (D (t)/K (t)), or,
φ (t) = m [q + r (t)] d (t) (15)
6
Next, we turn to the borrowing function, B (t). In any given period t, let a fraction a (t) of
the total investment made by the firm sector be financed by fresh borrowing, i.e.
B (t) = a (t) I (t) (16)
The fraction, a (t), will be determined by the financial structure of the firms, i.e. the manner
in which the firms decide to finance fresh investments. To arrive at a particular level of a (t)
the firms need to take two kinds of decisions: (a) the decision on distribution of the cost of
investment between internal (i.e. retained profits) and external (i.e. debt and outside equities)
sources of finance; and, (b) the decision on how to distribute the proportion of investment costs
marked for external source between debt and equity financing. We first note the following:
Proposition 1. For a given level of profits, a higher rate of investment would necessarily mean
a higher level of outside sources of finance.
Proof. Following a flow of funds approach, we note that the firm sector receives its funds from
retained profits, borrowing and equity financing, and uses these funds in making planned invest-
ment, paying out outstanding debt commitments, and in unplanned accumulation of inventories,
i.e. σP (t)+B (t)+E (t) ≡ I (t)+R (t)+∆N (t), where ∆N (t) represents the unplanned accu-
mulation of inventories by the firm sector in period t. Substituting from (2), (3), (13) and (15),
we have
B (t) + E (t) ≡
(
1−
ψ
s
)
I (t) +m [q + r (t)] {d (t)}2K (t) + ∆N (17)
⇒
∂ (B (t) + E (t))
∂I (t)
≡
(
1−
ψ
s
)
> 0 (18)
In other words, for a given level of profits, higher the level of investment higher would be the
use of outside sources of finance like debt and outside equities.
Further, though a detailed analysis of equity financing is beyond the scope of our analysis,
we note the following:
Remark 1. Between two sources of external finance, there might be an increasing preference
for debt as the rate of investment increases.
Remark 1 could be explained by the following:
1. The main difference between debt and equities is with regard to the resulting payment
commitments. While the payment commitments arising out of debt commitments, consist-
ing of the principal and the interest, is independent of profits, the payment commitments
arising out of equity financing, consisting of dividends, (1− σ)P (t), depend directly on
profits. Hence, in periods of prosperity, characterized by a high rate of both investment
and profits (related through the multiplier from (3)), cost of equity financing would be
higher. In other words, any increase in investment would increase the cost of equity
financing faster than the cost of debt financing.
2. Further, as increases in investment leads to increased recourse to external financing from
proposition 1, the managers of the firms might be averse to continue increasing the dilution
of shareholding from equity financing. Since a dilution of shareholding, by changing the
ownership structure, increases the threat of hostile takeovers and change in corporate
controls (provided, of course, such markets exist), managers might prefer debt financing
when the requirement of external financing is higher.
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It should be pointed out that proposition 1 and remark 1, taken together, establishes a direct
relationship between the fraction of investment cost in any period, a (t), financed by debt, B (t).
In addition, we also note the following:
Remark 2. An increase in the level of financial fragility, λ, might necessitate financing a higher
proportion of the cost of investment through debt.
We should note that remark 2 is motivated by the relationship implied in (14). A higher
level of financial fragility, λ, from (14), will imply that a higher fraction outstanding debt
commitments will have to be repaid in the current period. This will require a higher level
of borrowing, to be used not only towards meeting the cost of investment but also towards
repaying outstanding debt commitments.
From proposition 1 and remark 1 and 2, we suggest the following functional form for a (t):
a (t) = a (g (t) , λ (t)) ; ag > 0, aλ > 0 (19)
which, taking a linear functional form and substituting from (2), (3) and (12), might be ex-
pressed as
a (t) =
k [q + r (t)] s
σψ
d (t) (20)
where k is a constant. Substituting from (13), (15), (16) and (20) into (9), we have
d˙ (t) =
[{
k (q + r (t)) s
σψ
− 1
}
g (t)−m (q + r (t)) d (t) + r (t)
]
d (t) (21)
2.3. Financial Determinants of Investment
We now turn our attention to the financial determinants of the rate of investment. To begin
with, we suggest that the financial accelerator, γ, depends inversely on the rate of interest. This
could be because
(a) an increase in the rate of interest increases the the cost of servicing debt for firms financing
a part of their investment through debt;
(b) an increase in the rate of interest increases the opportunity cost of investing in physical
capital; and
(c) an increase in the rate of interest, by increasing the likelihood of an adverse selection of
risky projects might lead to an increase in credit rationing and red-lining and abandonment
of projects which might have been feasible at a lower rate of interest.
Next, we turn to other financial determinants of investment.
Consider the process of assessment of loan application by lenders. Any decision on such
an application, in the form of an approval or lack of it, would involve a detailed analysis of
the creditworthiness of the loan application. While the actual process of an assessment of
creditworthiness can be quite complicated3, we consider a simple version of this process here.
Broadly, the quantitative factors determining the creditworthiness of a loan application might be
categorized into two classes: those which remain unchanged across various stages of a business
3See, for instance, Kalapodas & Thomson (2006) and Abrahams & Zhang (2009) for a discussion of the process
of credit risk assessment.
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cycle; and, those which vary as an economy moves through a business cycle. In the first category,
which might be considered as a preliminary assessment by the lending institutions, we might
include permanent factors like the credit history and reputation of an individual, or a group of
individuals. Based on these factors, the lending institutions assign a credit rating or score to the
borrowers. A borrower might be classified as either prime or sub-prime through such a process.
Once classified, the identity of a borrower does not change across various stages of the business
cycle; in other words, a change in the rate of capacity utilization will have no impact on this
identity of the borrower. However, the final decision on creditworthiness, in addition to above,
is also likely to consider an additional component that includes current determinants. This
would include, for instance, the current income of the loan applicant and an assessment of the
expected future income. Assessment of future income might include, among other things, the
expected profitability and risk associated with the investment project for which the borrower
seeks a loan. As would be evident, these factors would vary across various stages in a business
cycle; in particular, it would depend on the current rate of capacity utilization.
We begin by attempting to formalize the first, i.e. the fixed component of creditworthiness.
As we noted above, this depends on an individual credit rating of each borrower. Consequently,
consider the portfolio of a lender; this portfolio will be characterized by a certain spread of
prime or safe, and sub-prime or risky borrowers. This might be formalized by introducing η,
an indicator of the proportion of borrowers with high perceived risk of default in the overall
debt portfolio, such that η ∈ [0, 1]. A higher value of η would imply a greater proportion of
borrowers with high perceived risk of default in the macroeconomic distribution of debt.
It is often argued4 that periods of relative prosperity might be accompanied with a gradual
worsening of the profile of borrowers, leading to inclusion of borrowers with higher perceived
risk of default (i.e. the sub-prime borrowers). This inclusion of sub-prime borrowers would be
quite evident if the prudential norms followed by the lenders are fixed at an absolute level. For
instance, if having access to a particular value of loan requires furnishing a fixed amount of
collateral, it is clear that a greater number of potential borrowers would be able to provide the
required collaterals, and hence, have access to loan in periods of prosperity. In other words,
those excluded by the debt market during periods with lower levels of economic activity would be
included during periods of prosperity. The prudential norms, however, typically do not remain
fixed but, in fact, are relaxed during periods of prosperity, because of optimistic expectations.
Apart from a direct relaxation, financial innovation and predatory lending practices by organized
lenders during a boom and emergence of new financial instruments might aid such relaxation
of prudential norms during periods of prosperity5. This reinforces the impact of a phase of
prosperity in increasing the proportion of risky borrowers in the macroeconomic distribution of
debt.
Next, we formalize the above argument. Since the period of prosperity, as defined throughout
our analysis, is characterized by an increase in u, Y and g, we suggest the following functional
formulation for the proportion of risky borrowers, η in the portfolio:
η (t) = ηgg (t) (22)
4See, for instance, Fisher (1932, 1933), Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986, 1994).
5See, for instance, Kregel (2008), Shiller (2008), Abrahams & Zhang (2009), Reinhart & Rogoff (2009), Akerlof
& Shiller (2010).
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where ηg is a constant such that ηg ∈
]
0, 1gmax
]
.
We now construct a cumulative index of risk of default by including the impact of η, as defined
above in (22), and the macroeconomic indicator of financial fragility, λ, as defined in (10), as
follows:
Λ (t) = Ληη (t) + Λλλ (t) (23)
where Λη and Λλ represent the sensitivity of the cumulative index of risk of default to η and λ
respectively.
One should note that the cumulative index of risk of default, Λ, consist of two separate risk
components. These two components might be interpreted as emerging from two different kinds
of risks involved in credit expansion. The first, or the proportion of risky borrowers in the
macroeconomic distribution of debt or η, might be considered an indicator of risk involved in
credit widening, i.e. inclusion of new borrowers, some of whom might be considered subprime.
The second, the macroeconomic indicator of financial fragility or λ, on the other hand, might
be considered a more conventional financial ratio that takes into account both credit deepening
and credit widening. Hence, taken together, Λ might be considered a more comprehensive
macroeconomic indicator of risk of default than some of the conventional indicators, since it
takes into account both credit deepening and credit widening.
There are two ways the rate of investment might be affected by the risk of default. Firstly, as
we have argued before, the managers are concerned with the risk of default, since in case of a
default, a firm might face a hostile takeover, leading to a change in corporate control threatening
the job of the managers. Hence, an increase in Λ might prompt the managers to respond by
reducing the sensitivity of the rate of investment to the capacity utilization, i.e. the accelerator.
Secondly, the lenders are concerned with the risk of default. An increase in a macroeconomic
indicator of the risk of default like Λ is likely to make them more cautious about lending. In
light of a substantial literature in this area,6 we might note that a rationing and red-lining of
credit might be one of the possible responses from the lenders under such a situation. While
such a rationing and red- lining will directly affect only a section of borrowers, all borrowers are
likely to take steps to reduce the possibility of being rationed and red-lined. Since individual or
firm-level gearing ratio is one of the deciding factors on which firms are rationed or red-lined, an
increase in Λ is likely to induce individual firms to to respond by trying to reduce their gearing
ratios. Since this logic applies to all the firms, an increase in Λ will have a negative impact on
the accelerator of the investment function.
We formalize the arguments given in the paragraphs by introducing the following formulation
for the accelerator:
γ (t) = µ¯− µˆΛ (t)− αr (t) (24)
where µˆ is the sensitivity of the accelerator to the cumulative risk of default, α is the sensitivity
of the accelerator to the rate of interest, and µ¯ represents the maximum possible level of the
6See, for instance, (Kalecki 1937, Hodgman 1960, Catt 1965, Stiglitz & Weiss 1981, Stiglitz & Weiss 1983, Jaffee
& Stiglitz 1990, Stiglitz & Weiss 1992).
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accelerator. Substituting the values of λ (t) and η (t) from (12) and (22) into (23), and then
substituting the resultant expression into (24), we have
γ (t) = µ¯− µˆΛηηgg (t)−
µˆΛλ {q + r (t)} s
σψ
d (t)
g (t)
− αr (t) (25)
Substituting the value of accelerator, γ (t), from (25) into the investment function in (7), we
have
g⋆ (t) = γ¯ +
1
sβ
[
µ¯− µˆΛηηgg (t)−
µˆΛλ {q + r (t)} s
σψ
d (t)
g (t)
− αr (t)
]
g (t) (26)
Let the rate of investment be continuously adjusted so as to meet a fraction, h, of the gap
between the actual and the desired rate of investment, i.e.
g˙ (t)
g (t)
= h (g⋆ (t)− g (t)) (27)
where h represents the speed of adjustment of the actual investment to the desired level by the
investors. Substituting the value of g⋆ (t) from (26) into (27), we have the following equation
of motion to represent the dynamics of the rate of investment:
g˙ (t) =
[(
µ¯
sβ
− 1
)
g (t)−
µˆΛηηg
sβ
{g (t)}2 −
µˆΛλq
σψβ
d (t)−
µˆΛλ
σψβ
r (t) d (t)
−
α
sβ
g (t) r (t) +
γ¯
sβ
]
hg (t)
(28)
2.4. Interest Rate Rules
The rate of interests in our model is determined by the Central Bank, following a modified
version of Taylor Rule7 that targets the level of capacity utilization and adjusts the rate of
interest as a response to the gap between the target and the actual level of capacity utilization.
We contend that directly targeting the rate of capacity utilization, instead of targeting inflation
as is usually the standard practice in the literature, will take care of several criticisms regarding
the transmission mechanism of such interest rate rules, levelled among others by (Fontana &
Palacio-Vera 2002, Arestis & Sawyer 2004, Arestis, Baddeley & McCombie 2005, Arestis &
Sawyer 2008). If the level of capacity utilization desired by the Central Bank is represented by
u⋆ (where 0 < u⋆ ≤ 1), then its interest rate rule is given by
r˙ (t)
r (t)
= l (u− u⋆)
⇒ r˙ (t) = l
{
g (t)
sβ
− u⋆
}
r (t) (29)
where l is the speed of adjustment of the rate of interest by the Central Bank.
7By Taylor rule, we imply a monetary policy rule suggested by Taylor (1993), in which the monetary authorities
change the rate of interest in response to the deviation of the rate of inflation or the level of output or
some combination of both from a pre-specified target rate. Several studies have shown that such interest
rate rules, with small modifications, are now either explicitly or implicitly followed by a large number of
central banks around the world, (see, for instance, Bernanke 1996, Clarida & Gertler 1997, Clarida, Gal´ı &
Gertler 1998, Judd & Rudebusch 1998, Taylor 1999, Clarida, Gal´ı & Gertler 2000, Woodford 2002).
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2.5. Final Model
Equation (21), (28) and (29) together completely describes our dynamical system, reproduced
below for clarity:
g˙ (t) =
[(
µ¯
sβ
− 1
)
g (t)−
µˆΛηηg
sβ
{g (t)}2 −
µˆΛλq
σψβ
d (t)−
µˆΛλ
σψβ
r (t) d (t)
−
α
sβ
g (t) r (t) +
γ¯
sβ
]
hg (t)
r˙ (t) = l
{
g (t)
sβ
− u⋆
}
r (t)
d˙ (t) =
[(
kqs
σψ
− 1
)
g (t) +
ks
σψ
g (t) r (t)−mqd (t)−mr (t) d (t) + r (t)
]
d (t)
(30)
We note that the dynamical system represented by (30) has only one economically meaningful,
i.e. interior non-trivial steady state, which we refer to as ENT :
(
g¯NT , r¯NT , d¯NT
)
, where
g¯NT = sβu
⋆ (31a)
r¯NT =
µˆηgΛηs2β2σ2ψ2m(u⋆)
2+{Λλµˆk2qs3β+(β2σ2ψ2m−µˆΛλkβσψ)s2−µ¯sβσ2ψ2m}u⋆−γ¯σ2ψ2m
(µˆΛλk2s3β+αsβσ2ψ2m)u⋆+µˆΛλksσψ
(31b)
d¯NT =
µˆηgΛηks4β3(u⋆)
3+{ks4β3−(αq+µ¯)ks3β2+(α+µˆηgΛη)s2β2σψ}(u⋆)2+{(βσψ−γ¯k)s2β−µ¯βσψs}u⋆−γ¯σψ
µˆηgΛηs2β2σψm(u⋆)
2+{(βσψm−µˆΛλk)s2β−(αq+µ¯)sβσψm}u⋆−µˆΛλkqs−γ¯σψm
(31c)
We should note that the economically meaningful steady state value of g, g¯NT , is completely
determined only from the equation of motion for r in (30). In other words, the interest rate rule
followed by the Central Bank determines the steady state rate of capacity utilization at u⋆, and
consequently, the steady state rate of investment at sβu⋆. We further note that g¯NT satisfies the
economic feasibility condition, since u⋆ ∈ ]0, 1[ ⇔ g¯NT = sβu
⋆ < sβ = gmax. A local stability
analysis of the steady state shows that under certain combination of parameters, the non-trivial
steady state ENT is locally stable, i.e. trajectories starting from its local neighborhood converge
to it (see appendix A). Typically, the chances of convergence are greater for lower levels of l -
the speed of adjustment of the rate of interest by the monetary authorities. For any given value
of parameters, the trajectories converge provided l < lˆ, where lˆ is the critical value of l.8
It might be noted that dynamics underlying the system represented by (30) has similarities
with ecological models in the class of generalized three-dimensional Lotka-Volterra system with
two predators and one prey. This class of models have been widely studied in the literature in
the field of mathematical ecology.9 The debt-capital ratio, d, and the rate of interests, r might
8The destabilizing impact of a higher value of l is primarily due to overshooting dynamics of the negative
feedback effect played by the rate of interest. This feedback effect is discussed in greater detail in the
following sections.
9See, for instance, Koch (1974), Butler & Waltman (1981), Smith (1982), Cushing (1984), Gardini, Lupini &
Messia (1989), Hofbauer & So (1994), Korobeinikov & Wake (1999), Hsu, Hwang & Kuang (2001), Loladze,
Kuang, Elser & Fagan (2004), Feng & Hinson (2005); a collection of results for a class of such systems might
be found in Zeeman (1993) and Zeeman & Zeeman (2002); for a more general discussion in the context of
dynamical possibilities in three-dimensional differential equation systems, see Kuznetsov (1997).
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be seen to be analogous to the population of predators, whereas the rate of investment, g might
be seen to be analogous to the population of prey. Underlying such a analogy with models
in ecology, however, there is a complex interaction of several macroeconomic feedback effects.
Before we proceed with our discussion of the solution to the dynamical system represented
by (30), we provide a brief discussion of these macroeconomic feedback effects.
3. Macroeconomic Feedback Effects
Consider the dynamical system represented by (30) in steady state, when it is disturbed by
an increase in the rate of investment, g. The total effect as a result of this increase in the rate
of investment might be decomposed into several macroeconomic feedback effects. We provide
a list of few of these effects below, by isolating each of them and ignoring all the other effects.
1. Multiplier-Accelerator Relationship: There is a positive feedback effect resulting from an
interaction between the multiplier (a positive feedback from investment to output) and
the accelerator (a positive feedback from output to investment via demand). The actual
working of this effect is shown below:
g ↑
multiplier
−−−−−−→ Y ↑
by (4)
−−−−→ u ↑
accelerator
−−−−−−−→ g⋆ ↑
by (27)
−−−−→ g ↑
2. Financial feedback I: There is a negative feedback effect arising from the interaction of
the investment function with the Taylor-type interest rate rule. Due to reasons discussed
above, the rate of interest has an inverse effect on the rate of investment. Rate of invest-
ment, on the other hand, has a positive effect on the rate of interest, since any increase
in the rate of investment, ceteris paribus leads to an increase in the rate of capacity uti-
lization, making the monetary authorities upwardly revise the rate of interest (provided,
of course, one started out from a situation of equilibrium where the rate of capacity uti-
lization was equal to the rate desired by the monetary authorities).10 The working of this
feedback effect is shown below:
g ↑
multiplier
−−−−−−→ Y ↑
by (4)
−−−−→ u ↑
Taylor rule
−−−−−−−→ r ↑
investment function
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ g⋆ ↓
by (27)
−−−−→ g ↓
3. Financial feedback II: There is a negative feedback effect arising from the a rise in the
rate of investment worsening the profile of borrowers in the macroeconomic distribution
of debt. As noted above, an increase in the rate of investment leads to an increase in
the proportion of risky or subprime borrowers in the macroeconomic distribution of debt.
This increases the cumulative index of risk of default, which in turn has a negative impact
on the rate of investment through the investment function. The working of this feedback
effect is shown below:
g ↑
by (22)
−−−−→ η ↑
by (23)
−−−−→ Λ ↑
investment function
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ g⋆ ↓
by (27)
−−−−→ g ↓
4. Financial feedback III: There is a negative feedback effect arising from a rise in investment
inducing a greater fraction of investment being financed by borrowing, leading to a rise
10We should also note that the strength of this feedback would depend on the policy parameter, l. A higher
value of l, by strengthening this negative feedback effect, might set in an overshooting dynamics which will
eventually have a destabilizing impact on the dynamics of the system.
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in debt-capital ratio and the macroeconomic indicator of financial fragility, eventually
dampening the rate of investment through the investment function. The working of this
feedback effect is shown below:
g ↑−→ B ↑−→ d ↑
by (12)
−−−−→ λ ↑
by (23)
−−−−→ Λ ↑
investment function
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ g⋆ ↓
by (27)
−−−−→ g ↓
5. Secondary financial feedback: There are at least two secondary negative feedback effects
arising from the interaction of the investment function with the Taylor-type interest rate
rule. As mentioned above, an increase in the rate of investment would induce the monetary
authorities to increase the rate of interest. From thereon, however, in addition to the
direct feedback effect on the rate of investment discussed above, there are two additional
feedback effects. Firstly, an increase in the rate of interest increases the debt repayment
commitments, leading to a rise in the macroeconomic indicator of financial fragility. This
will dampen the rate of investment through the investment function. Secondly, an increase
in the rate of investment also increases the borrowing requirements. This will increase
the debt-capital ratio, and hence, the macroeconomic indicator of financial fragility, once
again dampening the rate of investment. These two feedback effects are shown below:
(a) g ↑
multiplier
−−−−−−→ Y ↑
by (4)
−−−−→ u ↑
Taylor rule
−−−−−−−→ r ↑
by (12)
−−−−→ λ ↑
by (23)
−−−−→ Λ ↑
investment function
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ g⋆ ↓
by (27)
−−−−→ g ↓
(b) g ↑
multiplier
−−−−−−→ Y ↑
by (4)
−−−−→ u ↑
Taylor rule
−−−−−−−→ r ↑−→ B ↑−→ d ↑
by (12)
−−−−→ λ ↑
by (23)
−−−−→ Λ ↑
investment function
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ g⋆ ↓
by (27)
−−−−→ g ↓
4. Convergence and Comparative Dynamics
In this section, we attempt a comparative dynamic analysis to determine the sensitivity of
the non-trivial steady state, ENT with respect to some of the parameters. For this purpose,
we restrict our analysis to the case where the non-trivial steady state, ENT is locally asymp-
totically stable. We note, first of all, that the economically meaningful long-run steady state is
completely insensitive to the rate of adjustment parameters, viz. h and l, representing the rate
of adjustment of investment by the private sector and that of the rate of interest by the central
bank respectively. This should not come across as surprising. The process of adjustment, both
by the private investors and the central bank takes place in the short-run. Since long-run steady
state is attained only after the process of adjustment has taken place, the rates of adjustment
by both private sector and the central bank has no impact on the long-run steady state, as
expected.
4.1. Factors affecting steady state rate of growth
We recall from (31a) that at the non-trivial steady state, the rate of investment, g¯NT = sβu
⋆.
It follows that ∂g¯NT /∂s = βu
⋆ > 0, ∂g¯NT /∂β = su
⋆ > 0 and ∂g¯NT /∂u
⋆ = sβ > 0, i.e.
g¯NT depends directly on the propensity to save, s, the output-capital ratio determined by the
technology, β, and the level of capacity utilization desired by the Central Bank, u⋆. We further
note that ∂g¯NT /∂ψ > 0 and ∂g¯NT /∂σ > 0, i.e. g¯NT depends directly on the share of profits in
national income, ψ, and the fraction of profits retained by the firm sector, σ.
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The above results would need some clarifications in the context of a long-standing debate
in macroeconomics between the post-Keynesians on one side and both mainstream Keynesians
as well as Harrodians or neo-Marxians on the other. In both the mainstream Keynesian as
well as the Harrodian or neo-Marxian literature, an exogenously given rate of growth of output
or rate of capacity utilization is explicitly included in the model. Such an exogenously given
rate of growth of output or rate of capacity utilization is known variously as the ‘normal rate’,
the ‘natural rate’ or ‘non-accelerating inflation rate’. This exogenously given rate of growth
is typically included either in the investment function or in the specification of phillips curve
in such a way that in the long-run steady state, the economy grows along this exogenously
specified rate. Post-Keynesians, on the other hand, argue that such a ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ rate
either does not exist, or even if it exists, it must be determined endogenously from the short-run
growth rates. Empirical studies by Leon-Ledesma & Thirlwall (2000, 2002, 2007) also seem to
support such a position.
In light of the above debate, the comparative dynamics results for our model might seem
rather unexpected. We started out with a fairly standard post-Keynesian relationship between
the capacity utilization and the rate of investment, which was then augmented by financial
factors. Yet, the steady state rate growth looks similar to those in Harrodian class of models.
For instance, in Harrod’s (1939) original model, the economy grows in steady state at the rate
of sβ. The steady state rate of growth in our formulation, sβu⋆, like the Harrodian models,
is directly proportional to the propensity to save out of national income and the technological
output-capital ratio.11 In other words, the paradox of thrift operates only in the short-run but
not in the long-run. In this sense, our results are closer to both the mainstream Keynesian and
Harrodian literature, as opposed to the standard post-Keynesian result that paradox of thrift
operates both in the short-run as well as the long-run.
This apparent similarity that the long-run results of our model exhibits with the New-
Keynesian and Harrodian models, however, needs some qualifications. On a closer examination,
our model shows an important point of departure from these classes of models. We note that u⋆
is policy determined, and represents the target rate of capacity utilization by the central bank.
In this sense, the rate of capacity utilization at the steady state in our model is neither at the
full employment level, as in Harrod (1939), nor at the exogenously given ‘natural’ or ‘normal’
rate to which the private investors try to adjust their actual rate of investment. A corollary
from this would follow, that the monetary authorities are in a position to influence the long-run
steady state rate of growth, unlike the New-Keynesian or the Harrodian models, although such
an ability to influence the steady state will be limited only to the case where the non-trivial
steady state, ENT is locally stable.
4.2. Factors affecting steady state rate of interest
Recall the value of rNT from (31b). First of all, we note that ∂r¯NT /∂u
⋆ < 0 provided
γ¯ >
σψ
ks
(1− sβ) (32)
11In fact, if the monetary authorities in our model target full capacity utilization, then the rate of investment in
the steady state of our model would algebraically coincide with that of Harrod’s (1939) model.
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where both σψ/ks and 1 − sβ are less than 1 (see appendix B). We note that (32) provides a
sufficient (though not necessary) condition for the steady state rate of interest, r¯NT to have an
inverse relation with the level of capacity utilization targeted by the Central Bank, u⋆. In other
words, if (32) holds true,12 then targeting a higher rate of capacity utilization by the monetary
authorities would imply that the rate of interest will be lower at the steady state.
Next, we consider the effect of a small change in the parameter µ¯ on the steady state rate
of interest, r¯NT . Partially differentiating r¯NT with respect to µ¯, we have ∂r¯NT /∂µ¯ > 0 (see
appendix B). We recall that the parameter, µ¯ refers to the non-financial component of the
investment accelerator, i.e. which is affected only by capacity utilization and is not dampened
by any of the financial factors. As we noted earlier, financial dampeners play a role in stabilizing
the the relationship between the multiplier and the accelerator. Since µ¯ represents the part of
the accelerator unaffected by the stabilizing impact of financial dampeners, a higher level of µ¯
would have destabilizing implications and would require more contractionary monetary policy
in the form of a higher rate of interest in the steady state in order to bring the economy to its
target rate of capacity utilization.
Next, we consider the effect of a small change in the parameter ηg on the steady state rate
of interest, r¯NT . Partially differentiating r¯NT with respect to ηg, we have ∂r¯NT /∂ηg < 0 (see
appendix B). We recall that ηg refers to the rate at which the proportion of risky borrowers in
the macroeconomic distribution of debt, η, responds to the rate of investment. A higher value of
ηg would imply that the proportion of risky borrowers, η increase faster as the rate of investment
increases. A higher η, on the other hand, by increasing the cumulative index of risk of default, Λ,
would tend to dampen the rate of investment. In other words, the macroeconomic mechanism
which operates through η is essentially self-limiting and stabilizing. Hence, it complements
the monetary authorities in stabilizing the system, reducing the necessity of stabilizing role of
the rate of interest. A higher etag would thus mean that the monetary authorities would, in
general, need to keep the rate of interest lower in order to achieve the target rate, leading to
an inverse relationship between ηg and the steady state rate of interest, r¯NT .
Finally, we consider the effect of a small change in the parameter Λη on the steady state
rate of interest, r¯NT . Partially differentiating r¯NT with respect to Λη, we have ∂r¯NT /∂Λη < 0
(see appendix B). The parameter Λη, we recall, represents the sensitivity of the cumulative
index of risk of default with respect to the proportion of risky borrowers in the macroeconomic
distribution of debt. In other words, a higher value of Λη means placing a greater weightage of
η in calculation of the cumulative index of risk of default. In other words, economies which are
institutionally more sensitive to a worsening of borrower profile would have a higher Λη.
13 As
would be evident, a higher Λη would mean a higher level of Λ for a given level of η, which in turn
would, through the investment function, have a dampening effect on the rate of investment.
12Consider, for instance, the numerical values of the parameters used for illustration in appendix A. The
configuration of parameters used therein satisfy the conditions mentioned above.
13For instance, the economies where financial crises and large-scale defaults are common might be more sensitive
to such worsening of borrower profile than the economies where financial crises are of rare occurrence.
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4.3. A Few Policy Considerations
We recall from section 2.5 and appendix A that local stability of ENT , depends on the rate of
adjustment, l, of the rate of interest by the Central Bank. In particular, local stability requires
that l is below certain critical value, lˆ. We next look at the relationship between this critical
value, lˆ, and the level of capacity utilization, u⋆, desired by the Central Bank. To simplify
this exercise, we consider a numerical example, where we keep the values of all the parameters
except u⋆ same as those we used for illustration in appendix A, i.e.
s = 0.3, σ = 0.4, ψ = 0.3, α = 0.5, q = 0.6, m = 0.6, k = 0.7,
β = 0.8, µ¯ = 0.3, µˆ = 0.4, ηg = 0.1, Λη = 0.1, Λλ = 0.9, γ¯ = 0.5
We find that, given the above configuration of parameter values,
∂lˆ
∂u⋆
< 0 ∀ u⋆ ∈ ]0, 1[ (33)
In other words, increasing the target level of capacity utilization by the Central Bank would
imply either of the following:
1. Either this will tend to increase the possibility of making the economically meaningful
steady state locally unstable, reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy and perhaps
making it meaningless, or,
2. The Central Banks will be forced to cut back l, i.e. the rate of adjustment of the rate of
interest to the rate of capacity utilization. Once again, this will have adverse implications
for the effectiveness of the monetary policy.
Thus, the above discussion suggests a trade-off before the monetary authorities. Since targeting
a rate of capacity utilization higher than a critical value might have adverse implications on
the effectiveness of the monetary policy, the monetary authorities might be forced to keep
down the desired rate of capacity utilization out of stability considerations, in order to keep
the monetary policy effective. This, in turn, might conflict with the socio-political objectives
of the policymakers, especially if stability considerations force them to target a rate of capacity
utilization below the socially desired level.
For the same numerical exercise, we further note that
∂lˆ
∂h
∈ ]0,∞] ∀ h ∈ ]−∞,∞[ (34)
so that a higher h will imply a higher critical value of l, lˆ, representing the maximum speed
with which the monetary authorities can adjust the rate of interest without creating stability
problems. In other words, faster the private investors adjust the actual rate of investment to the
desired rate, the more room the monetary authorities will have to conduct their monetary policy.
This might be interpreted as a restriction imposed on the monetary authorities to coordinate
their policy with the private sector. If the private sectors adjust their rate of investment faster,
the monetary authorities can work within a wider range of l, and can also match the private
sector in changing the rate of interest fast. On the other hand, if the private sector is slow in
adjusting the actual rate of investment to the desired rate then the monetary authorities would
also be forced to slow down their speed of adjustment of the rate of interest out of stability
considerations.
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One possible interpretation of the parameter, h, might be in terms of the degree of competition
in the economy. One might argue, for instance, that in an economy with very little competition
among firms, each firm will be under less pressure to adjust the actual rate of investment to
the desired rate than a highly competitive economy, where competition would force firms to
adjust their rate of investment faster. If we accept such an interpretation of h, then it would
imply that the monetary authorities would have more room to conduct their monetary policy
in a more competitive environment, since they will able to adjust the rate of interest faster. In
other words, from the point of view of flexibility of monetary policy, an economy characterized
by too little competition does not augur too well for the monetary authorities.
Finally, we should also note, from (33) and (34), that a higher level of h, interpreted above
to be representing a more competitive economy, would also allow the monetary authorities to
target a higher rate of capacity utilization, u⋆, without worrying about stability considerations.
Further, as we noted above, since the economy grows in the steady state at the rate of capacity
utilization desired by the central bank, we might conclude that a competitive economy might be
characterized by a steady state rate of growth at higher rates of capacity utilization than a less
competitive economy. In other words, absence of competition among firms will have adverse
consequences in terms of the steady state rate of capacity utilization.
5. Beyond Convergence: Cycles and Complex Dynamics
Next, we turn to the case where the non-trivial steady state is not locally stable. As we
mentioned above, a large literature on the class of two-predators one-prey Lotka-Volterra has
emerged in recent times, which shows a rich variety of dynamic behaviors possible in such
systems. In this section, we explore some of these possibilities.
We begin by exploring cyclical possibilities for the solution to the dynamical system repre-
sented by (30) from an application of Hopf Bifurcation theorem. We note the following:
Lemma 1. For the dynamical system represented by (30), under certain suitable parameter
configuration, there exist a critical value, lˆ, of the parameter representing the rate of adjustment
of the rate of interests by the monetary authorities, l, such that l = lˆ provides a point of Hopf
bifurcation.
Proof. Provided in appendix C.
It should be noted that existence of a Hopf bifurcation point due to appearance purely
imaginary eigenvalues opens up possibilities of emergence of limit cycles, including stable limit
cycles, as the parameter l passes through a critical value, lˆ. Existence of such stable limit cycles,
which might be interpreted as growth cycles in g, r and d, might be verified by various methods,
for instance, by following the method outlined in Kuznetsov (1997) and Edneral (2007), or by
using any standard bifurcation software like XPPAUT or MATCONT.
Thus, with all other parameters fixed, as the monetary authorities try to adjust the rate of
interest in an attempt to influence the capacity utilization, the parameter l might pass through
its critical value, lˆ. In this case, a unique limit cycle might emerge in the neighborhood of l = lˆ.
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This limit cycle might be stable or unstable depending on parameter configuration; in case it
is stable, then the solution trajectory is manifested as a growth cycle.
A few characteristics of this growth cycle should be pointed out here. To begin with, we
notice that this is a three-dimensional cycle; in other words, the growth cycle involves cyclical
fluctuations in all the three variables under consideration – the rate of investment or g, the rate of
interest or r, and the debt-capital ratio or d. The fluctuations in these three variables, however,
need not be synchronized in time. Further, there is a rather complicated set of macroeconomic
feedback effects which accompany such a growth cycle.
Consider, for instance, a situation of upswing, characterized by an increase in g. As we noted
in our discussion in section 3, this sets in a complex chain of events. We recall that an increase
in g leads to an increase in capacity utilization, eventually having a positive impact on the g
through an interaction of the multiplier and the accelerator. On its own, this would have been
destabilizing and would have resulted in an unbounded system. This, however, is countered by
a number of negative financial feedbacks.14
Firstly, during upswing, there is a credit expansion backed by a general optimism, resulting
in credit being disbursed to those borrowers who would, in more pessimistic times, have been
denied credit. This leads to a general deterioration of the profile of the borrowers, with an
increase in the proportion of subprime borrowers in the macroeconomic distribution of debt,
or an increase in η. This would, in turn, lead to an increase in the cumulative index of risk of
default or Λ, which, eventually will dampen the rate of investment.
Secondly, during upswing, there is a greater recourse to debt to finance the increase in the rate
of investment. This would have a positive impact on the stock of debt and debt-capital ratio or
d. An increase in debt-capital ratio, in turn, would lead to an increase in the macroeconomic
indicator of financial fragility or λ, and hence, the cumulative index of risk of default or Λ. This
would, once again, eventually dampen the rate of investment.
Thirdly, during upswing, an increase in g will lead to an increase in the capacity utilization
or u. As soon as the capacity utilization crosses its desired rate or u⋆, the monetary authorities
will hike the rate of interest according to the interest rate rule. This will eventually dampen
the rate of investment.
Finally, an increase in the rate of interest during the upswing, by the process mentioned
above, will also lead to an increase the payment commitments, and hence, the debt-capital
ratio or d. This might have two distinct effects. Firstly, it will increase the macroeconomic
indicator of financial fragility or λ, eventually leading to an increase in the cumulative index of
risk of default or Λ. Secondly, it will increase the borrowing requirements in order to pay the
increased debt commitments, leading to an increase in the macroeconomic indicator of financial
fragility or λ, increasing the cumulative index of risk of default and hence, rate of investment.
14As mentioned above, the macroeconomic feedback effects are analyzed by isolating each effect, ignoring the
impact of other effects.
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Each of the above feedback effects work with certain finite lag, so that the final trajectory
is a complex outcome of several such feedbacks with diverse lags in opposite directions. We
had seen in Datta (2011) and Datta (forthcoming) that an interaction between some of these
feedbacks are capable of producing cyclical outcomes. Results in this section show that all these
feedbacks taken together are also capable of producing cyclical outcomes, albeit under certain
specific configuration of parameter values.
A growth cycle, however, is only one of the possible outcomes for the system under considera-
tion. All the above feedbacks taken together are also capable of producing several other dynamic
outcomes, including very complex and chaotic dynamics. We look at a few such possibilities
in appendix D. A complete and exhaustive discussion of such possibilities, however, would be
both beyond the scope of this paper as well as a digression from its central theme. Nevertheless,
it will not be out of place to draw a general conclusion that the dynamical system represented
by (30) is capable of exhibiting a wide variety of dynamics, ranging from simple convergence or
cycles to very complicated dynamics including chaotic dynamics. We should also point out that
apart from the case of convergence, predicting the other dynamical possibilities would require
a very high degree of accuracy in measurement of various parameters. From the point of view
of policymaking, therefore, one of the policy prescriptions from this study might be to keep the
rate of adjustment of the rate of interest, l, within a given range so that the solutions converge
to the steady state and the policymaking remains effective. More specifically, this would involve
not adjusting the rate of interest too fast, so that the feedback dynamics do not get out of hand.
6. Concluding Remarks
The main conclusions we can draw from our discussion in the preceding sections are as follows:
1. We note, first of all, that a large number of macroeconomic feedback effects are simul-
taneously at work in this model. The final outcome, which is the aggregate of all the
macroeconomic feedback effects, would depend on the relative strengths of these effects
as well as the time taken to complete each of them. Hence, a model of this kind is capable
of exhibiting diverse dynamical possibilities. We, however, primarily focus our attention
on two such possibilities of interest: convergence and cyclical possibilities. We find that
under certain suitable configuration of parameters, there are possibilities for both. We
also note that by keeping the rate of adjustment of the rate of interest or l, which is a
policy variable, low, the possibilities of convergence are increased.
2. We also find that under certain conditions, the financial factors discussed in this paper
provide us with endogenous ceilings and floors to our system. For instance, in case of
convergence to ENT , since ENT is the only steady state in the positive real number space,
the model is bounded. Similarly, in case of a limit cycle emerging from Hopf bifurcation
(i.e. when the Hopf bifurcation point is non-degenerate), irrespective of whether the Hopf
bifurcation is supercritical or subcritical, the limit cycle will enclose a bounded region
within which the dynamics will be restricted. In other words, under certain configuration
of parameters, the solution is bounded. We have already shown numerical illustrations of
such configurations of parameters.
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3. In our study, we use a post-Keynesian investment function, i.e. an investment function
without an exogenously given ‘normal’ rate of capacity utilization. The monetary authori-
ties, however, target a specific rate of capacity utilization, given by their policy objectives,
using a Taylor-type interest rate rule. Given this formulation, we find that in an appar-
ent similarity with ‘Harrodian’ class of models, our model attains long-run equilibrium
at the rate of capacity utilization desired by the monetary authorities. This has usual
‘Harrodian’ implications, like the paradox of thrift not operating in the long-run.
4. We further note that in the long-run steady state, the economy grows at a rate of capacity
utilization desired by the central bank. In other words, as long as the dynamics are
bounded in the short-run, and our model does not break down, the monetary policy
is effective in determining the rate of capacity utilization in the long-run steady-state.
However, there are several question-marks on the effectiveness of the monetary policy.
Firstly, in case the solution trajectory does not converge to the steady state, we have a
situation where the desired capacity utilization might not be attained in the short-run.
This might be the case, for instance, if the trajectory cycles around the steady state in the
short-run, or moves about chaotically within a bounded region without ever attaining the
steady state. In this case, therefore, the effectiveness of monetary policy in the form of
an interest rate rule might be questioned. Secondly, as we noted in our discussion above,
at times the monetary authorities might be forced to target a rate of capacity utilization
which is socially not desirable, in order to ensure stability of the system.15 Under such
a situation, the rate of capacity utilization actually achieved by the monetary authorities
might differ from what the policymakers might have wanted to target.
5. Finally, we should also point out that the cyclical conclusions emerging from Hopf bifur-
cation must be subjected to further tests of non-degeneracy and stability of limit cycles.
We leave an investigation of these issues for future research.
Appendix A Local Stability Analysis of ENT
Here we examine the local stability properties of the non-trivial steady state, ENT . Lineariz-
ing (30) around the economically meaningful steady state, ENT , from the first-order term of its
Taylor expansion evaluated at ENT , we have

g˙ (t)
r˙ (t)
d˙ (t)

 ≈ JENT


g (t)− g¯NT
r (t)− r¯NT
d (t)− d¯NT

 (35)
where
JENT =


(µ¯− sβ − 2µˆΛηηgg¯NT − αr¯NT ) hu
⋆ −
(
µˆΛλk
σψβ
d¯NT + αu
⋆
)
hg¯NT −
µˆΛλk (q + r)
σψβ
hg¯NT
l
sβ
r¯NT 0 0{
ks
σψ
(q + r¯NT )− 1
}
d¯NT
(
ks
σψ
g¯NT −md¯NT + 1
)
d¯NT −m (q + r¯NT ) d¯NT


(36)
15See, for instance, the condition imposed by (33); targeting a higher level of capacity utilization reduces some
of the flexibility available to the monetary authorities.
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is the jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state, ENT .
Next, we calculate the characteristic equation to the jacobian matrix given in (36) and test
for the conditions for local stability from Routh-Hurwitz condition. Following (Flaschel 2009,
page 385, theorem A.5) for the characteristic equation represented by ϑ3+a1ϑ
2+a2ϑ+a3 = 0,
all the eigenvalues have negative real parts if and only if the set of inequalities a1 > 0, a3 > 0
and a1a2 − a3 > 0 is satisfied. We test for these inequalities and obtain the following:
1. a1 > 0 ∀ h >
m (q + r¯NT ) d¯NT
(µ¯− sβ − αr¯NT − 2µˆΛηηgsβu⋆) u⋆
2. a3 > 0 as long as all the parameters, including those representing the rates of adjustment,
i.e. h and l, are positive.
3. The expression, a1a2−a3 is a polynomial, which is linear in l and quadratic in h. Typically,
one can fix any one of the parameters, say h and calculate a critical range of the monetary
policy parameter, l, within which this expression will take a positive value.
Thus, one can expect that possibilities of local convergence to the economically meaningful
steady state, ENT , exists for a reasonable set of parameter values. For the sake of illustration,
if the parameters have values as follows:
s = 0.3, σ = 0.4, ψ = 0.3, α = 0.5, q = 0.6, m = 0.6, k = 0.7,
β = 0.8, µ¯ = 0.3, µˆ = 0.4, ηg = 0.1, Λη = 0.1, Λλ = 0.9, γ¯ = 0.5
and if the monetary authorities are targeting a capacity utilization of 80%, i.e. u⋆ = 0.8, and if
the rate of adjustment of investment by private sector is fixed at any positive value of h, say,
at h = 0.8, then it turns out that a1, a3 > 0. Further, a1a2 − a3 > 0 if the monetary policy
parameter is kept below a critical value, l < 0.367. For instance, l = 0.3 along with h = 0.8
will satisfy all the three conditions listed above, and the economically meaningful steady state,
ENT
(
g¯NT , r¯NT , d¯NT
)
, which in this case will attain a value ≈ (0.192, 0.334, 0.814) will be locally
asymptotically stable.
Appendix B Comparative statics for rNT
Partially differentiating r¯NT with respect to u
⋆, we have
∂r¯NT
∂u⋆
=−
[
βσψ
{
µˆ2ηgΛηΛλβ
2σψk2ms4u⋆2 + µˆηgΛηαβ
2σ3ψ3m2s2u⋆2 + γ¯ασ3ψ3m2
+(γ¯ks− σψ (1− sβ)) µˆΛλσψkms + (kqs− σψ) µˆΛλ
2k2s2
+2µˆ2ηgΛηΛΛβσ
2ψ2ks2mu⋆
}]
/
[
s
(
µˆΛλβk
2s2u⋆ + αβσ2ψ2mu⋆ + µˆΛλkσψ
)2]
(37)
We recall that kqs− σψ > 0, hence, it follows that
∂r¯NT
∂u⋆
< 0 provided
γ¯ >
σψ
ks
(1− sβ) (38)
where both σψ/ks and 1 − sβ are less than 1. Note that (38) is a sufficient (though not
necessary) condition for the steady state rate of interest, r¯NT to have an inverse relation with
the level of capacity utilization targeted by the Central Bank, u⋆.
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Partially differentiating r¯NT with respect to µ¯, we have
∂r¯NT
∂µ¯
=
βσ2ψ2mu⋆
(µˆΛλβk2s2 + αβσ2ψ2m)u⋆ + µˆΛλσψk
> 0 (39)
Partially differentiating r¯NT with respect to ηg, we have
∂r¯NT
∂ηg
= −
µˆΛηβ
2σ2ψ2msu⋆2
(µˆΛλβk2s2 + αβσ2ψ2m) u⋆ + µˆΛλσψk
< 0 (40)
Partially differentiating r¯NT with respect to Λη, we have
∂r¯NT
∂Λη
= −
µˆηgβ
2σ2ψ2msu⋆2
(µˆΛλβk2s2 + αβσ2ψ2m) u⋆ + µˆΛλσψk
< 0 (41)
Appendix C Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. This follows from an application of Hopf Bifurcation Theorem in ℜ3.16 We find that
a2 > 0 provided s > max
[
µ¯, σψk(q+r)
]
. We further note that the expression, a1a2 − a3 is a
polynomial, which is linear in l (representing the rate of adjustment of the rate of interest by
the monetary authorities) and quadratic in h (representing the rate of adjustment of the rate of
investment by the private sector). By fixing one of the rates of adjustment, say h, it is possible
to calculate a critical value of l = lˆ, such that the expression a1a2 − a3 vanishes. Hence, both
the conditions required for existence of Hopf bifurcation theorem are satisfied.17
For instance, if the parameters have the same value as in the numerical example in appendix A,
i.e.
s = 0.3, σ = 0.4, ψ = 0.3, α = 0.5, q = 0.6, m = 0.6, k = 0.7,
β = 0.8, µ¯ = 0.3, µˆ = 0.4, ηg = 0.1, Λη = 0.1, Λλ = 0.9, γ¯ = 0.5
then, with the monetary authorities targeting a capacity utilization of 80%, i.e. u⋆ = 0.8, and
the rate of adjustment of the rate of investment by the private sector fixed at h = 0.8, we have
a2 ≈ 0.5431l + .2266 so that a2 > 0 ∀ l ≥ 0; further, a1a2 − a3 ≈ 0.1192− 0.3245l, so that for a
critical value of l, lˆ ≈ 0.3674, the characteristic equation to the dynamical system represented
by (30) will have purely imaginary roots.
16cf. Asada (1995), Asada & Semmler (1995), Flaschel (2009).
17It might be noted here that we are interpreting the term “Hopf bifurcation” in lemma 1 in a limited sense
of emergence of purely imaginary roots. A stronger interpretation, in the sense of emergence of limit cycles
would require fulfillment of non-degeneracy conditions. Further, one also needs to take into account the
dependence of the first lyapunov coefficient on a second parameter, for instance, the rate of adjustment of
the rate of investment by the private sector, h. Any conclusion regarding emergence of limit cycles from Hopf
bifurcation must preclude destruction of these limit cycles due to the presence of a codim 2 bifurcation like
the Bautin bifurcation [cf. Kuznetsov (1997, chapter 8, section 8.3), Guckenheimer & Kuznetsov (2007a)]. We
leave an investigation into these concerns for future research.
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Appendix D Possibilities of Complex Dynamics
Consider, for instance, the case of emergence of limit cycles from Hopf bifurcation discussed
above. Consider a Poincare´ map for these limit cycles. An investigation of the multipliers
associated with the Jacobian matrix of the Poincare´ map would reveal possibilities of a Neimark-
Sacker bifurcation leading to emergence of invariant torus, in the neighborhood of the point
where these multipliers become purely imaginary. Further, a preliminary investigation of the
coefficients of the characteristic equation of the jacobian matrix evaluated at ENT reveals the
following:
1. We note that l = 0 ⇒ a3 = 0, i.e. if the monetary authorities follow a completely
passive monetary policy, then the product of the three eigenvalues, ̟1, ̟2 and ̟3, to
the jacobian matrix at ENT , vanishes. This is possible if and only if at least one of the
eigenvalues is zero.
2. If the above happens while a1, a2 > 0, then we have a fold bifurcation at l = 0, also
known as a saddle-node bifurcation. A variety of interesting dynamics might emerge
in the neighborhood of such a bifurcation for a three-dimensional system of differential
equations, including generation of multiple homoclinic orbits, disappearance of saddle-
nodes through Shil’nikov bifurcation leading to complex dynamics due to generation of an
infinite number of saddle-periodic orbits. [cf. Kuznetsov (1997, chapter 3 & 6), Kuznetsov
(2006)]
3. However, we also note that a1 is a linear function of h. For a critical value, hˆ, of h, where
hˆ =
m (q + r¯NT ) d¯NT
(µ¯− sβ − αr¯NT − 2µˆΛηηgsβu⋆)u⋆
we have a1 = 0. If this happens along with l = 0 ⇒ a3 = 0, while a2 > 0, i.e. both
the sum as well as product of the roots are zero, while sum of the product of the roots
taken two at a time is positive, then it follows that we have a zero eigenvalue along with
a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. This represents a case of Gavrilov-Guckenheimer
bifurcation, also known as Fold-Hopf bifurcation. This might trigger a variety of complex
dynamics, including bifurcation of Shil’nikov homoclinic and heteroclinic orbits, appear-
ance of invariant torus around a Hopf bifurcation limit cycle and its subsequent breakdown
leading to chaotic dynamics. [cf. Kuznetsov (1997, chapter 8, section 8.5), Guckenheimer
& Kuznetsov (2007c)]
4. Further, we note that h = 0 ⇒ a2 = 0 & a1 > 0, i.e. if the private sector is completely
passive in adjusting the rate of investment,18 then the sum of product of eigenvalues
taken two at a time vanishes. If this happens along with a passive monetary policy, i.e.
l = 0 ⇒ a3 = 0, then we have a situation of zero eigenvalue with a multiplicity of two.
This represents a case of Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation, also known as Double-zero bifurca-
tion, leading to a variety of interesting dynamical behaviors in the neighborhood of such
a bifurcation.[cf. Kuznetsov (1997, chapter 8, section 8.4), Guckenheimer & Kuznetsov
(2007b)]
18This might be the case, for instance, in an economy characterized by too little competition, where firms have
little incentive to adjust their rate of investment based on information on current values of variables.
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It may be mentioned here that many of the dynamics mentioned above might be observed
from a numerical simulation exercise, using any standard bifurcation software like XPPAUT or
MATCONT.
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